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About this sample: This document represents the output of the thinking. The value is in the conversations that produced it — the site walk, the stakeholder interviews, the engineering judgements made along the way. What you are reading is the record. The work that matters happened before the first page was written.
Exercise Parameters
Client
[REDACTED]
Exercise Format
Full-Stack TTX
Duration
7 Hours
Date
[REDACTED]
Participants
[N] across Ops/IT/Leadership
Scenario
Ransomware — OT Impact
Exercise Scenario

The exercise simulated a ransomware attack originating from a compromised vendor remote access session. The scenario progressed from initial detection of encrypted historian servers, through production impact decisions, to regulatory notification obligations and external communications management.

Key inject points included: discovery of encrypted systems, loss of SCADA visibility, management escalation, regulatory notification window, and media enquiry handling.

By Response Area
Detection & Initial Response
Partial
Escalation & Communication
Gap
Production Decision-Making
Partial
Regulatory Notification
Gap
Recovery Coordination
Partial
Note: Scores reflect exercise performance against documented procedures. Gaps identified are normal outcomes — the exercise exists to find them safely.
Identified Response Gaps
Gap IDAreaObservationPriority
TTX-G01EscalationNo documented escalation path for cyber incidents in OT. Participants unsure who to call and in what order. Decision delayed by [X] minutes.High
TTX-G02RegulatoryNIS2 notification obligation not understood by participants. No documented notification procedure. Regulatory contact details not known.High
TTX-G03ProductionNo documented criteria for safe production shutdown decision. Decision made by consensus rather than procedure, causing [X] minute delay.Medium
TTX-G04CommunicationsNo pre-approved holding statement for external/media enquiries. Participants improvised — responses inconsistent across leadership.Medium
TTX-G05RecoveryPLC and SCADA recovery procedure not documented. Engineering team uncertain of restoration sequence and safe-state verification steps.High
From the Exercise Floor
Within 20 minutes of the first inject, a critical gap in escalation authority was visible. The operations team knew there was a problem. They did not know who had authority to call an external response. That gap would not have appeared in a document review. It appeared because the scenario put the team under realistic pressure — which is exactly why the exercise exists.
Gap Closure Actions
GapActionOwnerTarget
TTX-G01Develop and publish OT cyber incident escalation procedure. Test in next exercise.[REDACTED]30 days
TTX-G02Map NIS2 notification obligations. Document process and rehearse with legal/compliance.[REDACTED]60 days
TTX-G03Define production shutdown criteria and decision authority matrix. Embed in OT IRP.[REDACTED]45 days
What this enables: The full After-Action Report documents all observations across the exercise, all identified gaps, a prioritised action plan with owners and timescales, and recommendations for the next exercise scenario.