The exercise simulated a ransomware attack originating from a compromised vendor remote access session. The scenario progressed from initial detection of encrypted historian servers, through production impact decisions, to regulatory notification obligations and external communications management.
Key inject points included: discovery of encrypted systems, loss of SCADA visibility, management escalation, regulatory notification window, and media enquiry handling.
| Gap ID | Area | Observation | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| TTX-G01 | Escalation | No documented escalation path for cyber incidents in OT. Participants unsure who to call and in what order. Decision delayed by [X] minutes. | High |
| TTX-G02 | Regulatory | NIS2 notification obligation not understood by participants. No documented notification procedure. Regulatory contact details not known. | High |
| TTX-G03 | Production | No documented criteria for safe production shutdown decision. Decision made by consensus rather than procedure, causing [X] minute delay. | Medium |
| TTX-G04 | Communications | No pre-approved holding statement for external/media enquiries. Participants improvised — responses inconsistent across leadership. | Medium |
| TTX-G05 | Recovery | PLC and SCADA recovery procedure not documented. Engineering team uncertain of restoration sequence and safe-state verification steps. | High |
| Gap | Action | Owner | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| TTX-G01 | Develop and publish OT cyber incident escalation procedure. Test in next exercise. | [REDACTED] | 30 days |
| TTX-G02 | Map NIS2 notification obligations. Document process and rehearse with legal/compliance. | [REDACTED] | 60 days |
| TTX-G03 | Define production shutdown criteria and decision authority matrix. Embed in OT IRP. | [REDACTED] | 45 days |