This Gap Assessment Report documents the findings of a structured assessment conducted against the IEC 62443 standard and NIST CSF 2.0 framework. It identifies the precise distance between your current OT/ICS security posture and the target maturity level agreed at engagement scoping.
The report is structured in four sections:
| Section | Title | Contents | Audience |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Executive Summary | Overall maturity score, top 5 findings, immediate actions | Leadership / Board |
| 02 | Assessment Methodology | Scope, framework mapping, assessment approach and limitations | Technical / Management |
| 03 | Detailed Findings | Gap register — all identified gaps with evidence, risk weighting, and operational impact | Technical |
| 04 | Visual Resilience Roadmap | Phased remediation plan — quick wins, 90-day actions, long-term programme | All |
The following is an extract from Section 03 of the full report. The complete gap register contains [N] findings across all assessment domains. Each finding includes the IEC 62443 requirement reference, observed evidence, risk weighting, and a recommended treatment action.
| Gap ID | Domain | Finding | Risk | IEC 62443 Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GA-003 | Network Architecture | No documented zone and conduit model exists. OT and IT traffic traverse the same network segment without enforced boundary controls. | High | SR 5.1 / ZCR-1 |
| GA-007 | Asset Management | No complete OT asset inventory exists. Passive monitoring during assessment identified 14 devices not present in any documented register. | High | SR 7.8 / AM-2 |
| GA-011 | Access Control | Shared engineering accounts in use across multiple PLCs. No individual accountability for configuration changes. No account review process documented. | Medium | SR 1.1 / AC-3 |
| GA-014 | Patch Management | No formal OT patch management process exists. Three historian servers running OS versions with known unpatched CVEs (CVSS 7.8, 6.5). | High | SR 7.7 / PM-1 |
| GA-019 | Incident Response | Incident response plan does not address OT-specific scenarios. No escalation path defined for process-impacting cyber events. Last tested 2021. | Medium | SR 6.1 / IR-4 |
| GA-022 | Remote Access | Vendor remote access via a single shared VPN credential. No session recording, no time-limited access, no formal approval process. | High | SR 1.3 / RA-2 |
| GA-025 | Security Awareness | No OT-specific security awareness training delivered. Staff awareness assessed as low — 3 of 8 operators unaware of removable media policy. | Low | SR 2.1 / AT-1 |
| Phase | Timeframe | Actions | Effort |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quick Wins | 0 – 30 days | Document asset inventory. Implement individual accounts on PLCs. Remove shared VPN credential. | Low |
| Phase 1 | 30 – 90 days | Design and implement zone/conduit architecture. Deploy OT patch management process. Deliver security awareness training. | Medium |
| Phase 2 | 90 – 180 days | Deploy passive OT network monitoring. Update and exercise incident response plan. Implement vendor access management platform. | High |
| Ongoing | 180+ days | Annual reassessment. Continuous monitoring review. IEC 62443 ML-2 formal certification preparation. | Ongoing |